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Matter of Law, Question of Policy: Kosovo's Current
and Future Status under International Law
Epaminontas E. Triantafilou*
I. INTRODUCTION
The collapse of communism signified the transition to a new world order
and a new balance of power in areas formerly controlled by Moscow. In these
areas, the transition opened a path towards national self-assertion and reversion
to historical roots, the memory of which Soviet internationalism and cultural
conformism had sought to eradicate. Nations that had previously coexisted
under the guise of communist comradeship swiftly brought forth competing
claims to land, cultural symbols, and historical lineage. In the "powder keg of
Europe," the Balkans, the sparks of nationalism triggered armed conflicts: four
wars have ravaged the Balkan Peninsula since 1991.1 The last of these wars, the
one over Kosovo, ended in 1999. The ensuing peace nonetheless has not
necessarily brought hope of a final resolution to the area's underlying problems.
In fact, the high potential for further conflict has forced organizations such as
the UN to extend protection to certain populations that claim selfdetermination, without, however, creating independent states that could
subsequently clash anew with neighboring hostile populations.2 This approach
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The reference is to the armed conflicts in Slovenia (although some scholars would not include it
as a Balkan state), Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and, more recently, Kosovo. Admittedly, in 2001,
Albanian separatists and government forces clashed in the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia ("FYROM"); however, the conflict was not of a scale or character that would justify
its elevation to the level of war.
In the most recent equivalent action, the United Nations ("UN") established, through Resolution
1272, the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor ("UNTAET'), although
parties to the conflict partook in decisionmaking. Other less similar manifestations of the UN
trusteeship power have appeared for relatively short periods in western New Guinea, Namibia,
and Cambodia. See Michael J. Matheson, United Nations Governance of Postconflict Societies, 95 Am J
Ind L 76, 77 (2001). See also Lt. Col. Michael J. Kelly, Restoring and Maintaining Order in Complex
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found prominent application in the province of Kosovo, which is currently
under UN interim administrative control.

II. THE UN IN KOSOVO: THE LEGAL PROBLEM
This Development initially explores the current status of the Kosovar
province under international law and suggests that the legal justification for the
UN Interim Administration in Kosovo rests on questionable grounds.
Nonetheless, the weak legal justifications for the current UN presence may
reflect a delicate political solution to a complex problem. As the second part of
this Development demonstrates, unequivocal UN support for a final solution
that would be more consistent with international law could introduce instability
in an already volatile area.'
The open question as to the source of the UN's authority to effectively
govern Kosovo is of current significance, mainly for two reasons. First, it
muddles the starting point of negotiation regarding the final status of the
province. Serbs and Albanians have renewed their efforts to compromise, but
exactly how much say each side will have in the final solution is unclear.'
Negotiations are currently taking place under pressure from the EU, which is
eager to stabilize the area hoping to include it in the Union, and from the United
States, which shares European security concerns and is in need of an exit
strategy.5 Second, the degree of UN involvement in Kosovo suggests that the
organization will have an active role in shaping the territory's final status. The
Peace Operations: The Search for a Legal Framework 167-81 (Kluwer Law Intl 1999) (proposing
application of the law of occupation to certain UN peacekeeping operations).

4
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The legal aspect of the UN's intervention has received surprisingly little attention, when
compared to its attendant practical problems. On the latter, see, for example, Hansjtrg
Strohmeyer, Making MultilateralInterventions Work: The U.N. and the Creation of TransitionalJustice
Systems in Kosovo and East Timor, 25 Fletcher F World Aff 107 (Summer 2001) (offering possible
solutions to problems that arise on the ground in the context of UN interim administrations).
This Development, however, addresses an emerging tension between the legal nature of the UN
system and its dedication to sustainable peace and security. Especially novel peace-keeping roles,
such as the one the UN has undertaken in Kosovo, may require new approaches to interpreting
the UN Charter. Although comprehensive treatment of this subject is beyond this Development's
scope, an amendment or new official interpretation of the relevant parts of the Charter (discussed
below) would constitute significant steps in augmenting the legitimacy and effectiveness of similar
UN missions in the future.
It is unlikely, for example, that Serbia will enter the negotiations with the same bargaining power
as would be expected of a sovereign about to cede a portion of its land. For an interesting
illustration of the UN Mission in Kosovo's projected level of participation, which promises to be
significant, see Janusz Bugajski, R. Bruce Hitchner, and Paul Williams, Achieving a FinalStatus
Settlement for
Kosovo,
available
online
at
<http://www.publicintemationallaw.org/
programs/balkans/kosovo/KosovoReport.pdf> (visited Mar 28, 2004).
US disengagement is partially mandated by the need for personnel to be available for other
missions. See Will Dunham, Eager to Free Troops, U.S. Reassesses Balkans Duty, Reuters (Sept 21,
2003).

Vol5 No 1

Matter ofLaw, Question ofPolig

Tiiantafiloa

absence of solid legal ground for the UN presence could undermine the
legitimacy and sustainability of any UN recommendation regarding that status.
This Development concludes that absent drastic changes in the Balkans that
6
would alleviate security concerns, a final resolution is not forthcoming.

III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Beginning after World War II, Marshal Josip Broz Tito's regime provided
Kosovo with a certain amount of autonomy, as part of measures aimed at
preserving and strengthening the cohesion of the nascent Yugoslav state.
Kosovo had a predominantly Albanian population, whose original aspiration was
to join Albania or to achieve some form of independence Granting Kosovo
local self-government, therefore, was a way to abate Albanian separatism. This
self-government, however, was effectively dismantled in 1990 by Slobodan
Milosevic's Serbian nationalist regime. 8 This policy change towards Kosovo
occurred in part because Milosevic's government rallied popular support on a
Serb nationalist platform. Serbs considered and still consider Kosovo "the cradle
of the medieval kingdom, the Serbian 'Jerusalem,"' and abhor the prospect of
full Albanian control of the territory.9 On the other hand, Albanians have been a
majority in Kosovo for many years, and have an equally strong claim to the land
and its history. The Yugoslav government's interventionism in the early 1990s
10
translated into police abuses and repression against Albanians. In 1996, an

7

A similar position is taken in Simon Chesterman, Kosovo in Limbo: State-Building and "Substantial
Autonomy" 4-5 (Ind Peace Academy Aug 2001).
Although Tito's partisans had promised the Kosovars the option to choose which country they
wanted to join after the end of World War II, the Yugoslav state never fulfilled that promise,
annexing Kosovo instead. See W. van der Wolf, ed, The Kosovo Cisis: Facts, Figures, and Documents
28 (Global Law Assn/Wolf Legal 1999).

8

Peter Radan, The Break-Up of Yugoslavia and InternationalLaw 197 (Roudedge 2002).

9

Sabrina P. Ramet, The Kingdom of God or the Kingdom of Ends: Kosovo in Serbian Perception, in Mary
Buckley and Sally N. Cummings, eds, Kosovo: Perceptions of War and Its Aftermatb 30, 31 (Continuum
2001). The tension in Serb-Albanian relations, as one may infer from their history, had persisted
for many years, leading an observer as early as 1984 to suggest, prophetically, that post-Tito
Yugoslav leaders' ability to continue Tito's "balancing act" would be the key to Yugoslavia's
future stability. Patrick F.R. Artisien, A Note on Kosovo and the Future of Yugoslav-Albanian Relations:
A Balkan Perspective, 36 Soviet Studies 267, 268-69 (Apr 1984). The political impetus Milosevic
gained through his inflammatory nationalist rhetoric led some observers during the war in
Kosovo to conclude that even NATO's relentless aerial bombardment of Yugoslavia was unlikely
to subdue Serbian intransigence. See Jon C. Pevehouse and Joshua S. Goldstein, Serbian Compliance
or Defiance in Kosovo? StatisticalAnaysis and Real-Time Predictions 43 J Confi Res 538, 544-45 (Aug

6

1999).
10

Such attempts at independence were suppressed through imprisonments and persecutions. See
Statement /y Republic of Kosovo MinisterBukoski, March 21, 1994, in Philip E. Auerswald and David P.
Auerswald, eds, The Kosovo Conflict: A Diplomatic History through Documents 68, 68-69 (Kluwer Law
Intl 2000). For a synopsis of this period in recent Kosovar history, see OSCE, Kosovo/Kosova: As
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Albanian armed secessionist movement, the Kosovo Liberation Army ("KLA"),
emerged in Kosovo. In 1998, the KLA engaged government security forces in
clashes throughout the province.
The international community sought to avert further conflict, especially in
light of reported humanitarian abuses." After failed attempts at reconciliation,
NATO intervened by force. The Milosevic regime capitulated within eleven
weeks. On June 10, 1999, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1244,
which aimed at granting Kosovo "substantial autonomy" through the following
measures: the Yugoslav government was to withdraw all military, police, and
paramilitary forces from Kosovo; the United Nations, assisted by NATO, would
be responsible for both civil administration and military control; and, eventually,
the UN would oversee "the transfer of authority from Kosovo's provisional
institutions to institutions established under a political settlement.' ' 12 As Annex 1
to the Resolution notes, however, these measures would go into effect "taking
full account of ... the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." 3 In practical terms, the Resolution resulted in
the formation of a civil branch, the UNMIK, and of a NATO military branch,
the Kosovo Force ("KFOR").
IV. THE LEGALITY OF UNMIK UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
Against this background, several commentators have attempted to define
the current status of Kosovo under international law. Although the term
protectorate comes to mind, current literature avoids the term because of its
association with colonialism. Thus, some scholars argue that the UNMIK is a
"trusteeship" administration, an extended manifestation of the UN mandate to
manage conflicts and preserve the peace worldwide. 4 Aside from introducing a
relatively novel UN role, this assertion raises the issue of whether the UN
mandate is broad enough to encompass the Security Council's decision to de

11

Seen, As Told; An Analysis of the Human Rights Findings of the OSCE Kosovo Verfication Mission, October
1998 to June 1999 at 5 (OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 1999).
See, for example, Kosovo Purge "Stepped Up," BBC News (May 5, 1999) available online at
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/335509.stm> (visited Mar 28, 2004) (describing
alleged abuses).

12

Security Council Res No 1244, UN Doc S/RES/1244,

13

Id at annex 1 (cited in note 12). In subsequent years, the Republic of Yugoslavia, which
encompassed Serbia and Montenegro, further devolved into a loose federation of two republics,
Serbia and Montenegro. For purposes of this Development, the Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999
and current-day Serbia should be considered as the same entity.
Michael Bothe and Thilo Marauhn, UN Administration of Kosovo and East Timor Concept, Legaiy and
Limitations of Security Council-Mandated Trusteeship Administration, in Christian Tomuschat, ed, Kosovo
and the InternationalCommunity: A LegalAssessment 217, 218 (Kluwer Law Ind 2001). See also United
Nations Charter art 77(1), available online at <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter> (visited
Mar 28, 2004).

14

11 (June 10, 1999).

Vol5 No 1

Matterof Law, Question of Poligy

Triantafilou

facto occupy Kosovo and what role the UN may assume in promoting a specific
final status for the province.
There are several arguments in support of UNMIK's authority under the
UN Charter and customary UN practice. Before presenting and addressing
them, it is useful to note that Chapter XII of the UN Charter delineates an
"International Trusteeship System."'" Article 77 in particular suggests that
Chapter XII may be prima facie applicable in this case, since the trusteeship
system applies to: "a. territories now held under [League of Nations] mandate; b.
territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of the Second
World War; and c. territories voluntarily placed under the system by states
responsible for their administration."' 6 Indeed, Serbia placed Kosovo voluntarily
under the system (although one could argue that Serbia did so under military
pressure from NATO, which now represents the UN's "security branch" in the
area). However, the UN role with respect to such territories has been
traditionally determined by agreement with the country that placed the territory
under UN supervision, and has "typically amounted only to very general
supervision, as actual governance was carried out by the state granted the
trusteeship."'" Therefore, it is not surprising that even UNMIK's mandate refers
to Chapter VII, and not Chapter XII, to justify the UN governance of Kosovo.
According to supporters of UNMIK's legality, a "purposive interpretation"
of Article VII of the UN Charter vests the requisite authority in the Security
Council to establish and maintain a UN administration in Kosovo. That is,
although Chapter VII does not explicitly confer the power to establish such an
administration, this power can be inferred as necessary to uphold the principles
enumerated in Articles 1 and 2 of the UN Charter. Besides, under Articles 24
and 39, it is the Security Council's responsibility to preserve international peace
8
and security, and "trusteeship administrations" are another means to that end.
Further fortifying this view, other scholars note that although Resolution
1244 created an "international civil presence ... unprecedented in scope and
complexity," Article 41 brings such a presence well within the scope of the
Security Council's powers. 9 The Article allows the Security Council to use
measures "not involving the use of armed force" in effectuating its decisions.

15
16
17

18

19

See United Nations Charter arts 75-85 (cited in note 14).
Id art 77 (cited in note 14).
Matheson, 95 Am J Intl L at 76 (cited in note 2), citing Bruno Simma, The Charterof the United
Nations 933-72 (1994).
Bothe and Marauhn, UN Administration of Kosovo and East Timor at 231 (cited in note 14). For
example, Article 24(1) provides: "In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United
Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance
of international peace and security." United Nations Charter art 24(1) (cited in note 14).
Matheson, 95 Am J Intl L at 79 (cited in note 2).
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The Article continues: "These [measures] may include complete or partial
interruption of economic relations . .

.

and the severance of diplomatic

relations."20 Since the list of possible actions is "clearly exemplary and not
exhaustive," the argument goes, the establishment of the UNMIK falls within
the scope of the Article.
Additional arguments in support of the UNMIK include the assertion that
since the Security Council has the authority to create international crime
tribunals and other administrative organs in furtherance of peace and security,
nothing prevents it from establishing a complete civilian administration, which
essentially encompasses all these organs at once. Besides, Chapter VII does not
limit the measures the Council may adopt upon determining the existence of a
threat to or breach of the peace. The establishment of a full administration can,
therefore, be legitimately followed by border demarcation and vesting of
sovereignty in newly independent territories. In other words, "there can in fact
be situations in which the Security Council would be justified in directing a
permanent change in some aspect of the status, boundaries, political structure,
or legal system of territory within a state, if ...doing so is necessary to restore
' 21
and maintain international peace and security.
The above arguments seem flawed, however, in terms of both international
law and historical UN policies. Beginning with the so-called purposive approach
to interpreting the UN Charter, the question that immediately arises is why the
Security Council did not ground Resolution 1244 on the construction of specific
Articles. The Council mentions "purposes and principles" of the Charter, but
stops short of explicating which article(s) one would have to read purposively to
infer the UNMIK's authority to occupy Kosovo. Perhaps articles under Chapter
VII are the obvious answer; still, such a loose approach sweeps too far and
ignores the restraints built into the Charter. For instance, it is not obvious that
the establishment of an exclusively UN-run trusteeship is anticipated by Article
1(1) of the Charter. According to Article 1(1), one of the purposes of the United
Nations is "to take effective collective measures for the ... removal of threats to

the peace ...

and to bring about ...

in conformity with the prinples ofjustice and

international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes and
situations. 22 It seems peculiar to think that the Security Council would be acting
"in conformity with principles of . . .international law" when it effectively
creates new international law doctrine through the establishment of an
omnipotent trusteeship administration in the present case. The Charter appears
to limit the discretion of the Security Council to established principles of
international law. For the sake of flexibility, one may also argue that careful
20

United Nations Charter art 41 (cited in note 14) (emphasis added).

21

Matheson, 95 Am J Ind L at 85 (cited in note 2).

22

United Nations Charter art 1(1) (cited in note 14) (emphasis added).
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deviations are permissible, because of the generality of the language. However, it
seems imprudent to argue that any UN action is lawful under the Charter on the
assumption that it will eventually become embodied in international law as a
customary international practice."
In fact, a less purposive and more originalist reading of the UN Charter
supports the notion that the Charter's drafters did not provide the Security
Council with carte blanche, especially in the realm of peacekeeping. The phrase
"may include" in Article 41 can be read more reasonably as restrictive, rather
than as merely illustrative.24 There is no indication that the drafters wished to
expand the scope of the article to include any non-military activity as legitimately
promoting the decisions of the Security Council. After all, there are arguably
several restrictions to the Security Council's authority under Articles 39, 41, and
42. Article 42, for instance, could be read to support a principle of
proportionality in Chapter VII Resolutions in providing: "Should the Council
consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have
proved to be inadequate, it may take such action ... as may be necessary to maintain
. . . peace and security., 25 Limiting permissible action to the level of bare
necessity appears to support the incremental escalation of measures to counter
threats to the peace and suggests restraint in the actions of the Security Council.
Following this rationale in the past, the Council has cautioned participating
nations to act "commensurate[ly] with the specific circumstances ' 26 in Chapter
VII operations. The restraint built into the Charter, therefore, is inconsistent
with overbroad readings of the Articles regarding the Security Council's
discretion in preserving peace and security, and demonstrates that "strong
medicine" such as a trusteeship administration should be firmly grounded on
legal as well as policy grounds.
Indeed, the UNMIK transcends customary UN peacekeeping not only
theoretically, but also in practice. The relevant Article 2(7) of the Charter

23

24

25
26

Looking to the plain language of the Charter before resorting to purposive generalizations is
necessary under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1961), 23 UST 3227
(1972), TIAS No 7502, 500 UN Treaty Ser 95. For an argument that, in fact, "with only mild
overstatement, the [UN] Charter is what the principal organs do" see Thomas M. Franck, The Use
of Force in InternationalLaw,11 Tulane J Intl & Comp L 7, 8 (2003).
Arguably, in the absence of independent review of the Council's actions, the approach to
interpreting Title VII of the Charter needs to be stricter and more judicial in nature without,
however, compromising effectiveness when contemplating intervention in an internal conflict on
humanitarian grounds. See Matthias J. Herdegen, The "Consitutionahwlaion" of the UN Securio
System, 27 Vand J Transnad L 135, 141 (1994) (arguing for the establishment of a "judicial
counterweight" to the Security Council).
United Nations Charter art 42 (cited in note 14) (emphasis added).
Nicolas Angelet, InternationalLaw Limits to the Security Council, in Vera Gowiland-Debbas, ed, United
NationsSanctions and InternationalLaw 71, 73 (Kluwer Law Intl 2001), quoting Security Council Res
No 787, UN Doc S/RES/787, 12 (Nov 16, 1992).
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provides: "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to
settlement under the present Charter. 2 7 The same Article creates an exception
for cases where the UN acts to preserve the peace under Article 39. However,
this exception arguably applies insofar as the peace-threatening conflict is ongoing.
As the Charter suggests, subsequent measures should be focused on promoting
"settlement" between the opposing parties. Traditionally, "[p]eacekeeping
' 28
operations facilitate the creation or implementation of a negotiated settlement.
After Kosovo, it is not obvious that a trusteeship administration can properly be
considered as a settlement-promoting mechanism. In past peacekeeping
operations, the UN acted as an arbiter that intended to bring clashing sides to
the negotiating table and to broker viable solutions. For example, the first
trusteeship administration with significant UN involvement in governance was
instituted in Cambodia in 1991 and possessed some, but not comprehensive
administrative powers. The UN administration's powers were subject to the
authority of a Supreme National Council, which was comprised of
representatives of all interested parties. 29 UNMIK, on the other hand, is not
only brokering but also unilaterally shaping the final solution without necessarily
considering input from all the parties concerned. In this sense, the Kosovo
mission has broadened the scope of UN powers, while discounting the
importance of state sovereignty.
Conceivably, the line-drawing problem with overbroad, purposive readings
of the UN Charter also lurks in this discussion. To illustrate the underlying
policy concerns behind playing "fast and loose" with the Charter's provisions in
the Kosovar context, consider the Albanian claim to minority selfdetermination. Until recently, the right to self-determination of minorities had
existed in international law only as an abstract concept applicable to decolonized territories, not sovereign states.30 Yet, the same concept became a
27

United Nations Charter art 2(7) (cited in note 14).

28

Amy E. Eckert, UnitedNations Peacekeeping in Collapsed States, 5 J Intl L & Practice 273, 278 (1996).

29

Matheson, 95 Am J Intl L at 77 (cited in note 2), citing Agreement on a Comprehensive Political
Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, Oct. 23, 1991, art 6 & Annex 1, 31 ILM 183, 184 (1992).
Similarly, the short-lived UN administration of Eastern Slavonia (a Croatian region with a sizeable
Serbian community) was established under a treaty between the East Slavonian Serbian leadership
and Croatia, which reflected a consensus as to the future of the contested area. Thus, in sharp
contrast with Kosovo, the role of the UN administration consisted not in unilaterally occupying
the area, but in supervising and securing the implementation of a treaty between the opposing
sides. Chesterman, Kosovo in Limbo at 5 (cited in note 6).
Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law 161-62 (Cambridge 2d ed 1986). Others have argued that the

30

Serbs were colonial rulers of the Kosovars, thereby vesting the latter with the right to selfdetermination. See, for example, Enver Hasani, Uti PossideisJuris:From Rome to Kosovo, 27 Fletcher
F World Aff 85, 91 (Fall 2003).
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widespread defense of separatist tendencies in the Balkans. After the precedent
set by American and Western European policies of support towards such
tendencies, it will not be surprising if,
in the future, minority self-determination
arises as a principle of customary international law. Consequently, states with
separatist minorities (modern-day Russia, for example) will become warier of
granting these minorities increased autonomy, if doing so could open the door
for claims of territorial independence. 3 The Security Council was apparently
mindful of these implications and was careful to note in the Annex of
Resolution 1244 that principles of state sovereignty need to be balanced against
the Council's actions. 3 2 Similarly, the international community is not impervious
to these underlying dangers; after all, it "has so far refused to discuss possible
independence [in Kosovo] for fear of setting precedents for other separatist
minorities." 33 Overall, it seems inapposite to defend the legality of the UNMIK
on mere purposive readings, since loose interpretations may ultimately backfire
with unforeseeable consequences.
The Security Council introduced additional legal complications by actively
involving NATO in peacekeeping operations in Kosovo. Although the Security
Council can employ means other than the use of force in implementing its
decisions, the intimate cooperation of the UNMIK and KFOR made the latter
appear to be functioning under color of UN authority. KFOR, however, is a
military contingent that belongs to a coalition of countries that attacked
Yugoslavia, potentially in violation of the UN Charter.3 4 Thus, KFOR can be
31

32

This concern was precisely the starting point of Serbian repression against Kosovar Albanians in
the 1980s. See Artisien, 36 Soviet Studies at 268 (cited in note 9). However, the Albanian claim of
independence currently carries less force than before: while in the 1980s Albanians in Kosovo
could assert their independence under a constitutional provision, modern day Albanians
throughout the Balkans (Kosovo, Macedonia, Serbia) could seek to assert independence under a
principle of international law which is potentially inapplicable. Such a development would affect
strategic interests of local as well as international actors. The overarching concern is, therefore,
that UN support towards minority self-determination expands the scope of this principle and
increases the volatility of the Balkan area. See, for example, Misha Glenny, Balkans Challengesfor the
West, BBC News (July 1, 2001), available online at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/europe/
1416145.stm> (visited Mar 28, 2004) (arguing that Albanian nationalism and visions of a Greater
Albania, among other factors, increase the likelihood of protracted hostilities in the Balkans).
Indeed, under international law and the UN Charter in particular, state sovereignty is not a simple
rule, but a fundamental principle. See Nico Krisch, Selbstverteidigung und kollektive Sicherheit 331
(Springer 2001). See also United Nations Charter art 2(4) (cited in note 14).

33

34

Kosovo Endgame-Vienna Meeting Must Pave Way to Final Settlement Talkr, Fin Times 20 (Oct 15,
2003).
There is an extensive debate as to the merits of the "Clinton doctrine" of humanitarian
interventions or preemptive strikes on the part of NATO. Less disagreement arises, however, as
to whether NATO outright violated the UN Charter by attacking Yugoslavia without a UN
mandate. For a forceful assertion of this argument, see Richard A. Falk, Kosovo, World Order,and the
Future of InternaionalLaw, 93 Am J Intl L 847, 852 (1999). There was an attempt by the US and
NATO to contend that the use of force against Yugoslavia was authorized implicitly under
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viewed separately as an occupying force that launched a campaign against a
sovereign state (however legitimate the reasons). By furnishing KFOR with a
mandate to provide UNMIK with security, the Security Council de facto ratified
NATO's presence in Kosovo, and by extension justified the Alliance's prior
actions as consistent with the current UN mission in Kosovo. This is supported
by an additional and perhaps ironic observation. Since KFOR troops are
currently acting under a UN mandate, they are "coercive peace-keepers," that is,
soldiers that the UN has deployed and authorized to use all necessary means in
self-defense and in support of their mission.35 Under Article 105 of the Charter,
international law prohibits attacks against these NATO troops.3 6 However, the
same troops did not possess similar protection when attacking Yugoslavia in
1999. The protection extended to NATO troops through the UN reinforces the
view that the UN sanctioned ex post NATO's military action against Yugoslavia,
although the Security Council never authorized NATO's initial aggression.
Whatever the reasons (lack of resources,37 political pressures) the presence of an
official NATO contingent in Kosovo deprives UNMIK of some legitimacy
under international law.38
Finally, there is limited merit to the contention that the UN's ability to
establish administrative bodies and judicial organs implies that the UN possesses
a mandate to establish self-sufficient interim administrations with the authority
to vest sovereignty in new geopolitical entities. It seems counterintuitive to
interpret statutes by induction, assuming that authorization to assume or
establish certain administrative institutions amounts to the much broader power
to instate complete administrations. If the drafters of the Charter had envisioned
Resolutions 1199 and 1203 of the Security Council. Neither of these Chapter VII Resolutions,
however, authorized the use of force; they merely asserted that a threat to peace and security
existed at the time. Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., Jus Pacarii:Emergent Legal Paradigmsfor U.N. Peace
Operationsin the 21st Century 321-22 (Paciarii Ind 1999).
35
36

37

38

Sharp, Jus Paciariiat 123 (cited in note 34).
United Nations Charter art 105(2) (cited in note 14). According to the official UN interpretation,
under Article 105 "officials of the Organization shall similarly enjoy [in the territory of each of its
Member States] such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their
functions in connection with the Organization." General Assembly Res No 47/28, Resectfor the
Privileges and Immunities of Offcials of the United Nations and the Speda#Zed Agencies and Related
at
(1992),
available
online
Doc
A/RES/47/28
OqganiZations,
UN
<http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/47/a47rO28.htn> (visited Mar 28, 2004) (emphasis
added).
This is a very real concern: during the war in Bosnia, the UN peacekeeping force in the region
was ill-equipped to provide adequate protection to civilian populations in designated "safe areas,"
such as Srebreniqa. See Jane Boulden, Peace Enforcement: The United Nations Experience in Congo,
Somalia, and Bosnia 92-93 (Praeger 2001).
The administrative separation between UNMIK and KFOR does not obscure the overlap in their
mandate from the Security Council. See, for example, Marc Guillaume, Le Cadre Juridique de
lAction de la KFOR au Kosovo in Tomuschat, ed, Kosovo and the InternationalCommunity 249-50 (cited
in note 14).
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the possession of such power by the Council, surely they would have said so in a
relevant provision.

V. THE FUTURE OF Kosovo
The legal issues surrounding the UN administration of Kosovo are
certainly serious, yet it seems that political considerations actually control the
fate of the province. In connection with a potential future status for Kosovo,
four proposals have received systematic treatment: 1) indefinite protectorate
status; 2) partition of Kosovo, with the Albanians receiving the majority of the
land as well as independence; 3) full independence for the entire province; and 4)
conditional independence in the form of a loose confederation with Serbia.3 9
The Independent International Commission on Kosovo considered each of the
potential solutions and sided with conditional independence because it seems to
be the best manner for4 Kosovars to become self-governing, free from UN
administrative oversight.
Before examining any proposed solution, however, it is helpful to note that
predictions or suggestions regarding the future status of Kosovo involve a
balance between the interests of the Kosovars and the stability of the Balkan
region. As the analysis shows, the persisting instability casts doubt on
international organizations' ability to disengage from the area in the short run.
Consequently, Kosovo will remain a protectorate for the foreseeable future,
although the UN may delegate an increasing number of administrative functions
to the nascent Kosovar authorities.4 1
First, it seems unlikely that Serbia would unconditionally accept UNMIK's
authority to vest sovereignty in a new Kosovar state. After all, the need for
Serbia to cede sovereignty is part of the reason it will be an important participant
in any negotiations regarding the future of the province. The reasons Serbia
39
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might resist such a development are primarily political. The existence of a
Serbian minority in Kosovo combined with the enduring Serb belief that
Kosovo is a shrine of Serbian history means that any concession to the
Kosovars will come at a large political cost. This cost is likely to be much higher
for any government in which the newly elected nationalist Serbian Radical Party
participates.42 Furthermore, despite many analysts' emphasis on Serbs'
historical/psychological bond with Kosovo, the Serbian side is also called upon
to concede a mineral-rich and strategic area.43 Openly signaling that only
significant reciprocation from the Albanians and the international community
could convince the Serbs to give in, the Serbian Parliament in August 2003
proclaimed Kosovo an indisputable part of Serbia. 4 At the antipode, Albanians
perceive the Serbian unwillingness to compromise and observe warily as
international mediators voice concerns about the human rights of minorities and
about Balkan stability, should Kosovo become independent. The high stakes
suggest that the resulting negotiations and exchanges are likely to be protracted.
Recent developments confirm this expectation.4 5
Kosovar independence is currently unattainable for a host of domestic
reasons as well. Admittedly, geopolitical independence may be the only realistic
chance Kosovars will have at absolute self-rule and at regulating their relations
with other nations. Given the importance that the Kosovars have traditionally
attached to determining their own destiny, such a solution should abate the
sense of grievance that repeated repression has created among the population.
Even ignoring the obstacles posed by Serbian and western interests, however,
the UNMIK cannot transfer sovereignty to Kosovars before ensuring that
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certain conditions are met. Such conditions include the abatement of irredentism
and latent nationalism that can destabilize the area once again; the establishment
and proper implementation of a justice system; the adequate disarmament of
paramilitary forces that threaten the area's security; 46 and the Kosovars'
"commitment to regional cooperation, regional governance, and enduring
47
regional institutions.
Albanian preoccupation with the principle of self-determination suggests
that Kosovar independence could still constitute a spark that could bring about a
nationalist conflagration, since it would provide a legal (as well as political) basis
for sustained irredentism by Albanian populations throughout the region.
Indeed, visions of a Greater Albania still exist among Albanians in Kosovo,
Albania, and Macedonia. 4 By the same token, a "Greater Serbia" has become
once again a common term in Serbian politics, thereby promoting unrest among
the Serbian minority in Kosovo as well as among the Bosnian Serbs. It seems,
therefore, currently imprudent for the UN to sanction self-determination by
recognizing Kosovar independence. Besides, Kosovo apparently has not
achieved the requisite degree of internal order to become self-governing. The
justice system, for example, suffers from the inadequate training of judges, from
corruption, and from limited enforcement;49crime is rampant; and certain groups
that represent dubious interests still possess enough arms to cast a shadow over
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any attempt at stability. 0 Finally, Albanians themselves are sharply divided across
tribal lines and allegiance to more pacifist or more militant political forces, which
are likely to clash once given a free reign.
In all, it seems appropriate to surmise that the Balkan region is too
sensitive for novel experiments in statehood. The UN may have to devote
significantly more resources towards infrastructural changes in Kosovo and
towards stabilization in the Balkans as a whole before an independent Kosovar
territory can safely and legitimately become yet another ingredient in the diverse
ethnic mix of Southeastern Europe.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, although the case for the presence of the UNMIK in
Kosovo is strong, it does not derive sufficient legitimacy from international law,
since the actions of the Security Council with respect to Kosovo deviate in
significant respects from officially (or traditionally) established Charter
interpretations and peacekeeping procedures. This "legitimacy deficit" could
adversely affect negotiations regarding the future of the area as well as popular
perception of an already ailing collective security system. The United Nations,
therefore, needs to reshape the legal underpinnings of trusteeship
administrations to accommodate cases such as Kosovo, perhaps through a
deliberative process that will invite the input of all participating nations.
On the other hand, an unequivocal UN stance on the status of Kosovo
could have unforeseen consequences: more deference towards state sovereignty
could provide Serbs with a better bargaining card; the converse would favor
Albanians. Aware that settling the new international law of trusteeship
administrations could have rapid political consequences in Kosovo, the
international community retains its anticipatory stance, pending improvement of
interethnic relations and security in the Balkans. The current uncertain political
climate and the potential for further destabilization of the area suggest that
Kosovo is likely to remain under UN control, at least for the foreseeable future.
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